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Until the 1950s, a colossal statue of the pharaoh Ramses II lay on the ground at the 
archaeological site of Mit Rahina (ancient Memphis), just south of Cairo in Egypt. In January 
1955, however, Wing Commander ʿAbd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, Egypt’s Minister of Municipal 
and Rural Affairs, visited the site as part of the process of preparing for the statue’s removal 
to central Cairo.1 The Wing Commander had been busy overseeing modernization work in 
the city in the years after Egypt’s 1952 Free Officers’ coup, an insurrection directed against 
continued British influence in the country and its unpopularmonarch, King Faruq. Gradually, 
the coup had turned into a revolution whose figurehead was Gamal Abdel Nasser. And in a 
plan repurposed from Egypt’s colonial era, Ramses was to be a centerpiece of this national 
recalibration: moved, preserved, and re-erected with great fanfare, his statue would stand in 
the square by Cairo’s main railway terminus (fig. 1).2 A permanent fixture outside the bustle 
of what now became known as Mahattat Ramses (Ramses Station), press stories made certain 
that the statue became a symbol of Egypt’s pharaonic glories remade through the labor of its 
population. One article even stated that “it should be recalled that the majority of the 
workmen [restoring the statue] are from the Saʿid [Upper Egypt]. They take pride in the work 
… because they consider themselves the grandchildren of Ramses II.”3 As Nasser became a 
major figure and Egypt became a major player in the era of global decolonization, the Cold 
War, and non-alignment (not to mention pan-Arabism), Ramses became material—and 
carefully managed—proof of the florescence of the country’s move to independence and its 
link to the Egyptian masses. Almost overnight, the pharaoh’s statue moved from fallen icon 
to object of revolutionary heritage. Enmeshed within the institutions and networks of post-
1952 Egypt, Ramses as preserved artifact made revolutionary spectacle material.  
Yet fifty-one years later, in 2006, the Egyptian government under the presidency of 
Husni Mubarak moved Ramses’ statue back through Cairo (fig. 2) to a location adjacent to 
the Great Pyramid, just under twenty miles to the north of Mit Rahina on the Giza plateau. 
Again with great fanfare, anti-colonial revolution begat neo-liberal—and neo-colonial—
heritage preservation, an ironic rejoinder to the Nasser era’s subversion of a colonial-era 
project that had aimed to curate the symbolism of the past. Retracing most of his earlier route 
in reverse, Ramses now became a symbol of another Egyptian regime’s ambitions. The 
statue’s new location was the site of the still-to-be-completed Grand Egyptian Museum, 
whose construction has been funded since 2008 by soft loans funneled through JICA, the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency.4 Moving Ramses to Giza constituted not only a 
symbol of the Mubarak regime’s intentions, but also a signal to donors and debtors that Egypt 
was a state that would, now and in the future, repay investment. At the time of writing, the 
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regime of the current Egyptian president, ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, desperate to promote 
economic growth in the country, is pushing hard for the Grand Egyptian Museum’s 
completion. Pictures of the Ramses statue often sit at the center of this work (fig. 3), 
alongside images of the conservation labs and Egyptian specialists charged with caring for 
the thousands of objects that form the institution’s collection. These days, national spectacle 
in formerly colonized countries comes pre-loaded with (inter-)national debt. And ironically, 
that same spectacle allows international donors and experts to claim the ethical upper-hand as 
calls to decolonize heritage and preservation gain in intensity. Likewise, it allows debtor 
countries to foreground their own populations as primary agents in the global cultural field at 
the same time as leaders like al-Sisi strengthen the repressive tools that fortify the power of 
their states. In the contemporary world order, the economic and social disparities of 
colonialism have been remade, directed anew. Heritage and preservation, much as they 
always have been, are part of that revivification.    
How and why do such disparities persist? Does the history of “decolonization” itself 
explain this situation, and does that same history mean that it is difficult for such inequalities 
ever to be addressed? These questions sit at the heart of this special issue of Future Anterior, 
which attends to the wider reasons why Mit Rahina’s Ramses statue moved from being an 
object of colonial rule to one of national liberation and, years later, a focus of the 
international development industry and its asymmetries of power. Ramses II moved from Mit 
Rahina to Cairo in the midst of a global geopolitical shift to independence that placed Egypt 
front and center. Yet the connection of heritage-making to the—connected, but discrete—
politics and practices of anti-colonialism and decolonization took on a different hue by the 
time the statue moved from central Cairo to the Giza plateau: an object of national 
independence became one of national financial obligation, however soft the Japanese loans 
for the Grand Egyptian Museum, and however impressive the work there made Egypt look. 
How did such heritage and preservation practices become entangled with the global historical 
phenomenon of decolonization? What have the afterlives of that entanglement been, and can 
action be taken to arrest the inequalities in heritage and preservation practice that constitute 
some of the most obvious consequences of this genealogy? “Decolonization” has never been 
a neutral word. Can the history of that term ever really be overcome? Can the increasing co-
option of the word by the agencies and institutions who direct funding to decolonization 
initiatives in heritage and preservation ever be reversed? 
As I discuss below, historians in the widest sense are only now calling for these 
questions to be addressed with urgency (certain other scholars and activists are way ahead). 
In that context, then, this issue makes clear that thinking through the Ramses example and 
others like it makes possible the broader understanding of the histories at hand – an 
understanding necessary as global calls for the decolonization of knowledge take on 
increasing urgency. The Ramses statue, after all, has always been an object of top-down 
control, buffeted by various political processes: local, regional, and global. It is by attending 
to examples at the center of such processes that we can come to better know these histories 
and begin to unravel their consequences; if, that is, they can be unraveled at all. 
Put another way, it is imperative—and not at all difficult, despite the objections of 
various power-brokers—to draw a line between the histories of heritage, preservation, and 
movements like Rhodes Must Fall, Me Too, Decolonize This Place, and Black Lives Matter, 
at the same time as it is vital to take seriously the demands that those movements make (and 
with the humility and empathy to actually listen to the activists directing them). Yet it is also 
imperative to understand the historical conditions that have made those calls necessary, and 
the ways in which those circumstances have helped to constitute the heritage and preservation 
practices under question: not least the way in which institutions in those fields issue calls to 
“decolonize” themselves. In the case of Ramses, those circumstances might primarily seem 
economic, not least in the form of the loans taken out to build the Grand Egyptian Museum. 
Given the entangled nature of such domains, though, those conditions have also had a 
profoundly lived social effect: not only given the impact of debt on the populations of 
formerly colonized countries like Egypt (where structural adjustment programs have been 
multiple), but also in terms of who has access to objects of, and expertise in, heritage and 
preservation, let alone who enjoys authority in speaking about those practices.  Historians—





Unraveling those conditions  means acknowledging exactly how imperfect historical 
understanding of theinterplay between heritage, preservation, and decolonization is. Heritage 
and preservation gained increasing prominence as the “second wave” of decolonization took 
shape (the “first wave,” as Mark Thurner argues, had taken place in late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century South America).5 Consequently, that rise in visibility often occurred 
through the carrying out and publicization of work in newly independent countries: think 
only of UNESCO’s International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, which took 
place in Egypt and Sudan from 1960 onward, and whose spectacle was vital to the 
instantiation of the 1972 World Heritage Convention.6 Yet in a recent co-authored article in 
History Workshop Journal, Elisabeth Leake notes that, despite the growing number of calls 
for the decolonization of history, “as a scholar whose work is rooted in histories of 
decolonization … I am struck by the fact that decolonization as a historical phenomenon is 
conspicuously absent.” Indeed, Leake emphasizes that “there is little discussion or reflection 
on the processes of empire and its ending, even though these are historical forces that have 
been absolutely crucial to the world we live in today.”7 This special issue seconds that 
critique. It also contributes to the histories of decolonization in question by reflecting on how 
such historically grounded work might play a role in addressing the coloniality of knowledge 
in heritage and preservation today. The question is as much about empire and its end(s) as it 
is about “empire and its ending”: how to address “the continuing hidden process of 
expropriation, exploitation, pollution, and corruption that underlies the narrative of 
modernity,” as Walter Mignolo and Rolando Vazquez put it.8  
Scholars in heritage and preservation have started to show an increasing interest in the 
development of those fields, particularly in the vital inter- and post-war years. Notable recent 
work in this area includes Lucia Allais’ Designs of Destruction: The Making of Monuments in 
the Twentieth Century, and Lynn Meskell’s A Future in Ruins: UNESCO, World Heritage, 
and the Dream of Peace, alongside other studies that have started to broaden the geographical 
scope of the histories at hand: Indonesia, Turkey, and Cambodia have all recently been the 
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focus of substantive work.9 More generally, there has been an explosion of scholarship in the 
histories of archaeology, anthropology, and museums that not only complements these 
volumes, but also integrates the study of material culture in creative and productive ways. 
Much of this latter scholarship, however, concentrates on the nineteenth, and first half of the 
twentieth, centuries, before the entanglement of the end of empire and global preservation 
efforts took on increased pace.10 How did this entanglement happen, what were its results for 
the ways in which heritage and preservation developed, and what have been the consequences 
for those fields today? In what ways, too, might these consequences now be grappled with?  
As I discuss further below, these questions cannot simply be answered by provenance 
research, as important as that research can be, and as much as such research seems to have 
become a major—or perhaps the major—route to provide answers in some places.11 The 
contributors to this special issue therefore address these questions by drawing on a 
geographically dispersed set of case studies in order to contextualize historically why calls 
for the decolonization of heritage and preservation have become urgent and widespread. In 
Egypt, Ramses II became an artifact of a revolution whose spectacle both allowed the often 
unwelcome expansion of the postcolonial state into people’s lives, but which also engendered 
new and genuine forms of national feeling.12 In more recent years, however, his statue has 
become a symbol of international development’s neo-colonial—and neoliberal—integration 
with heritage work. How did such transformations occur, and how might they be connected to 
the earlier ways in which decolonization and the making of heritage took place? Emphasizing 
the global asymmetries to which such transformations are connected, in what ways, if any, 
have such relationships left room for more positive interventions that enable an escape from, 
and redrawing of, structural inequalities? Elsewhere, Chiara de Cesari’s Heritage and the 
Cultural Struggle for Palestine has demonstrated the ways in which, despite the globalizing 
processes it is embedded within, transnational heritage expertise has been appropriated within 
the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority after the 1993 Oslo Accords “with 
anticolonial politics as well as institution building clearly in mind.”13 Do—or can—other 
examples of this redrawing of heritage priorities flourish? Especially as calls for 
decolonization are mediated and captured by the organizations at which they are directed, this 
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special issue attends to such concerns, illustrating that knowledge of the practices and forms 
of power through which this situation has arisen over the longue durée is vital. That 
knowledge in place, calls for decolonization today can only become more effective.   
 
On Decolonization, Heritage, and Preservation 
 
To say that “the museum is not neutral” has become almost a truism in the past few years.14 
When discussing this point and the connected domains of heritage and preservation, however, 
it is imperative to understand that decolonization has itself never been a neutral process. As 
Stuart Ward notes, “‘decolonization’ was made in Europe, as part of a major realignment of 
metropolitan assumptions and expectations with an ever-encroaching post-imperial world.”15 
First used in French in 1836, the term did not enjoy consistent or coherent use until the 
second half of the twentieth century, when its utility started to become increasingly clear to 
specific groups of power-brokers.16 As Todd Shepard has discussed, even in the 1950s, as the 
number of newly independent nation-states began to increase, “European and American 
scholars and politicians hesitantly applied it to describe specific shifts of sovereignty in 
particular territories.”17 And that hesitance ultimately points to the word’s widespread 
emergence only in the early 1960s, when the political need for Europeans to “manage” the 
end of empire became much more urgent.  
When decolonization became a widely used word, it became so with a particular, and 
distinctly European, purpose. As Shepard makes clear, that purpose is one that linked the 
word to notions of progress heavily embedded in countries like post-revolutionary France. In 
the early 1960s, during French discussions about how to end the Algerian War of 
Independence, the term decolonization gained a telos “wholly consistent with a narrative of 
progress … [and] the ongoing extension of national self-determination.” Or, writ differently, 
decolonization became “a historical category, an all but inevitable stage in the tide of 
History.”18 Consequently, countries (like France) now forcibly engaged in the process could 
claim that the—conveniently timeless and progressive—gerund of decolonizing continued to 
constitute expertise and authority safely within Europe and its metropoles. After Algerian 
independence in 1962, Charles de Gaulle would criticize Britain’s incomplete move to 
decolonize as indicative of a lack of dedication to the development of Europe itself. 
Implicitly, too, that criticism highlighted the way in which such progress was linked to the 
continued mobilization of European knowledge practices in formerly colonized nation-states 
through modernization programs, a situation within which current calls to decolonize find 
themselves embroiled.19  
Decolonization had a specific goal. Not everyone, then, felt the need to “decolonize.” 
In Egypt, for instance, the Arabic taḥrīr (“liberation”) was used to denote the end of colonial 
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rule; decolonization itself possesses no Arabic equivalent, even as “colonialism” (al-istiʿmār) 
does. Cairo’s Midan Tahrir—or Liberation Square, which became globally famous during the 
country’s 2011 revolution—had in fact been renamed under Nasser’s presidency; it was 
originally called Midan al-Ismaʿiliyya after the nineteenth-century khedive (or Ottoman 
viceroy) responsible for its construction. Liberation had constituted the appropriate term as an 
anti-colonial revolution came into being; and it is that purpose of anti-colonialism that reveals 
the asymmetries of the term decolonization itself. Indeed, anti-colonial writers like Frantz 
Fanon found themselves in a position to resist the word’s usage: he stated in the first 
paragraph of his 1961 The Wretched of the Earth that “decolonization is always a violent 
event.”20 This history does not render the current use of decolonization in relation to heritage 
and preservation work null and void. It does, though, render it urgent to understand the 
historical tensions present in that term, particularly as the violence identified by Fanon was 
marked, and particularly as those tensions echo a similar genealogy in the heritage-making 
practices under question. Whether physical, epistemological, material, or psychological, 
heritage as much as decolonization was always a violent practice.   
It is unnecessary to repeat at length that the values imparted through heritage and 
preservation have long tended toward a Euro-American discourse surrounding “The Modern 
Cult of Monuments,” even as those values became entangled with other positions as 
European empires began to crumble: anti-colonial, Afro-Asian, pan-Arab, or non-aligned 
among them.21 That situation does, however, prompt an urgent need to understand how the 
constitution of decolonization as inevitable historical stage overlapped with and strengthened 
that heritage discourse and its manifestations. As is the case with decolonization more 
broadly, to constitute this understanding involves moving beyond a methodologically naïve 
interpretation “of ‘diffusion’ from European origins.”22 Instead, historical value lies in 
comprehending how people who found themselves dealing with the imposition and 
implementation of decolonization worked with it and the experts, practices, and categories 
that it promoted. By working with that process, they—like Fanon or the Palestinians 
discussed by de Cesari—helped to establish the meaning and actions that this entanglement 
developed. Understanding heritage and its relationship with the end of empire, then, involves 
developing an understanding that does two things: highlights how the power relations 
connected to that process were always already asymmetrical and built upon a history of 
European colonial violence and classification (of gender, race, and belief, among other 
categories); and provincializes narratives that continue to place Europe and Europeans at the 
center of understanding how that process transpired. The papers in this special issue attend to 
these two points in various ways.  
In her contribution to the issue, Sarah Griswold outlines how the development of 
aerial surveillance in French-mandate Syria and Lebanon dovetailed with the development of 
aerial survey and photography as an archaeological tool. Her detailed analysis of such “high-
tech heritage” in this League of Nations-defined territory makes clear the ways in which the 
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post-war development of archaeology as a science concerned with space had always already 
been predicated upon a position of spatial—and thus geopolitical—dominance perhaps only 
possible in what George Stocking once termed “colonial situations.”23 Discussing the Jesuit 
priest Antoine Poidebard’s sorties with the 39th aviation regiment of the French Levant 
forces, Griswold emphasizes how “the use of early high-tech heritage techniques in colonial 
spaces reverberated widely and portended the turn toward technological epistemology that 
prospered in the decolonizing world,” not least because aerial archaeology “was one of 
several new ways to practice archaeology without having to face the [post-colonial] realities 
of spade-based archaeology” on the ground.24 The violence of military surveillance, it seems, 
begat the sometime violence of heritage expertise.25   
Heritage, though, has not always come into being through European intervention, as 
de Cesari and others have shown.26 In her contribution to the issue, Amal Sachedina furthers 
this conversation by discussing heritage-making practices in the Sultanate of Oman. Since the 
inception of the Sultanate under Qaboos bin Said in 1970 (with the aid, kept secret for several 
decades, of British military forces), Sachedina illustrates how the ubiquitous circulation of 
heritage imagery like the dalla (or traditional coffee pot) has worked to instantiate Oman as 
“a territorially grounded entity … tethered to the cultivation of a distinct historical 
consciousness that is immanent to social relationships, modes of authorizing time, and ethical 
techniques that permeate modern daily living.”27 Building on this understanding, Sachedina 
shows in her ethnography how Omani officials (with varying degrees of ferocity) see the 
deployment of heritage imagery both as a potential means of the country’s population coming 
to terms with globalization and as a way of dealing with the forms of Islamic revivalism 
promoted by Daʼesh (ISIS) and others.  
Heritage, or turath—a word which, importantly, carries meanings in Arabic beyond 
those connected to it in English—matters in Oman, and has long been the object of local 
attempts to shape its understanding.28 In particular, Sachedina shows how government 
officials have proposed that attachment to certain forms of heritage would enable Omani 
youth to successfully navigate a future viewed as contingent in a country whose historical 
Ibadi Islamic tradition had previously allowed a different, more stable (and more 
hierarchical) conception of time to prevail. Illustrating the performance of such attitudes even 
when officials engaged in “offering dates and pouring coffee” in government offices, 
Sachedina emphasizes the role that the governance and administration of heritage has played 
not only in the making of the independent nation-state, but also the role of heritage-making in 
overcoming the anxieties of nation-building—for power-brokers and their go-betweens, if not 
for others.29 What, though, of the citizenries who these power-brokers and their institutions 
claim to represent? That is another question, and one that moves beyond the spatial confines 
of particular territories.    
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On Object Restitution, and Object Agency 
 
Just as colonialism allowed European countries to attain global geopolitical dominance, so 
did that subjugation—and decolonization—often remove agency and the ability to represent 
themselves from the people over whom that dominance weighed. This is hardly an original 
thought: Edward Said’s Orientalism famously set it out over forty years ago.30 Yet this line of 
thinking bears repeating in an age when populism and culture-war seem to be reversing the 
weight of its credibility. So, too, is that reiteration useful when discussions surrounding 
particular types of colonially mediated objects have become heavily embroiled in these same 
arguments.  
This is not simply a question related to the place of heritage in formerly colonial qua 
colonial spaces. Instead, it is a global issue, tied to the transnational movement, channeling, 
and classifying of people and things that colonialism as a process set in chain, and which 
coloniality as a set of legacies has perpetuated. Most obviously, discussions surrounding the 
restitution of objects held by European and North American institutions have become 
imbricated in this situation, as have arguments connected to the future of monuments 
commemorating individuals who profited from the construction of racial inequality under the 
Euro-American aegis. At the time of writing, in Britain, the United States, and elsewhere, the 
toppling of statues commemorating Confederate generals, slave-traders, and colonial heroes 
has been allied to Black Lives Matter protests whose most recent direct cause was the murder 
of George Floyd by the Minneapolis police, but whose historical conditions of being are 
linked to the imperial project and the global violence of slavery and scientific racism (it 
would be wrong, as ever, simply to center this movement as emerging from “the West”). 
Those protests—and those acts of removal—have themselves become embroiled in the 
culture-war backlash that has followed. Meanwhile, objects held in former colonies have 
simultaneously become agents of populist and authoritarian political agendas: the statue of 
Ramses II discussed earlier being a case in point.  
Can the coloniality of objects, monuments, and their representation be resolved? Can 
the practices of heritage and preservation connected to this moment themselves be subverted 
or otherwise reassembled? The most obvious way in which this situation might be addressed 
also sometimes seems the most difficult one to achieve. As Sudeshna Guha notes in her 
contribution to this issue, “the powerful agency of the object world in resisting meaning-
making creates opportunities to devise methods of intervention into [what Laurajane Smith 
defined as] the authorized heritage discourse.”31 Yet to unleash that agency itself involves 
having command over the objects necessary to achieve that aim, an outcome that has 
remained far from simple for many people theoretically in a position to make claims of 
control upon them. The ability to speak in connection to material culture—not to mention the 
ability to speak in general—is not one that is willingly granted by certain cultural 
gatekeepers. As another contributor to this issue (by way of reprint) famously stated, “the 
subaltern cannot speak.”32 Worse still, “if you are poor, black and female you get it in three 
ways.”33        
 In Europe and North America in particular, many institutions seem to be fighting to 
maintain their stranglehold over objects obtained under colonial rule. In Britain, for example, 
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even as university and other, smaller collections have started to accede to dialogue around the 
repatriation of objects removed under colonialism, national collections seem to be fighting a 
rear-guard action against just that possibility.34 This action has been triggered in part by the 
November 2018 Rapport sur la restitution du patrimoine culturel africain (Report on the 
Restitution of African Cultural Heritage) commissioned by French president Emmanuel 
Macron from  philosopher-economist Felwine Sarr and  art historian Bénédicte Savoy. 
Relating specifically to French collections (but having clear implications for institutions in 
other countries), among other points the report suggested that the standard burden of proof 
relating to how objects came into collections should be reversed, placing the onus on 
museums to explain why items had come to be in their possession.35  
 Sarr and Savoy’s report constitutes a substantive attempt to reverse the politics of 
representation analyzed by Said and many others since. More strikingly still, it suggests a 
recuperative possibility both historically unmatched in the museum world and tempered by a 
pragmatic rationalism about what is actually achievable. As Sarr and Savoy have highlighted 
in interviews, their goals with the report have often been overstated or misrepresented 
entirely: “the point is not to empty museums, which would be an unrealistic goal.”36 As Sarr 
himself told Deutsche Welle, the presupposition that “the countries making demands want 
everything back … does not seem to be the case.”37  
Yet such discussions have not stopped museum directors from making statements that 
are defensive in the extreme. Attracting considerable criticism as a result of his words, 
Tristram Hunt, Director of London’s Victoria and Albert Museum, stated in an opinion piece 
in The Guardian that “for a museum like the V&A, to decolonize is to decontextualize: the 
history of empire is embedded in its meanings and collections, and the question is how that is 
interpreted.”38 Elsewhere, too, responses to the Savoy-Sarr report have been lukewarm. The 
British Museum, long an obvious target of criticism related to repatriation requests, has 
opened (or continued) discussions on long-term loans and exchange programs with 
institutions in formerly colonized countries. Simultaneously, the institution has noted the 
importance of provenance research. It has also, though, stood behind the 1963 British 
Museum Act, which states that the institution cannot deaccession items from its collections 
except in a limited number of circumstances.39 
 As the restitution argument continues to simmer, it is unclear how long such defenses 
will remain tenable. Likewise, it is unclear how long the illusion, particularly beloved of 
newspaper op-ed pages, that a “debate” about the rights and wrongs of repatriation is possible 
will last. The British Museum’s statement in response to the George Floyd protests drew a 
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storm of derision, at least on social media.40 And it is unclear—especially given the 
inequalities so clearly visible during the current Covid-19 pandemic—that the flurry of 
statements released by other cultural and heritage institutions will be taken seriously unless 
accompanied by positive and proactive action in creating genuine structural change in terms 
of whose voices get heard within, and amplified by, museums. In a piece published in the 
aftermath of George Floyd’s murder and the accompanying tearing down of Confederate 
monuments in the United States, Marisa Brown has stated “that preservation [in the country] 
is facing an existential crisis.” That conclusion rings true, not least because, as she discusses, 
“many of our historic buildings and sites memorialize settler colonialism and white 
supremacy.”41 So, too, does Brown’s prescription for the alleviation of this issue speak sense. 
Rejecting the “contextualization” of such monuments, Brown suggests:  
 
I want to see preservation organizations and public commissions think 
critically, and publicly, about how their work has valorized and supported 
white dominance and supremacy, and what the work and make-up of their 
organizations would look like if antiracism were mission central.42 
 
Brown’s are strong—and necessary—words. Yet it is not simply preservation in the United 
States and Europe where such issues are relevant.  
 
In the “Post-Colony” 
 
In the formerly colonized world, the reassembly of preservation and heritage practice itself 
faces difficulties. It is unclear, for example, to what extent the sort of object-agency-as 
resistance called for by Sudeshna Guha is possible in former colonies, where, over time, 
nation-making practices have constituted various inequalities among citizenries. Discussing 
the ways in which the post-independence Indian state made use of antiquities and museum 
display, in this issue Guha (like Amal Sachedina) emphasizes the ways in which objects and 
practices connected to preservationist action worked to negate or amplify certain voices even 
as colonialism drew to a formal end. Importantly, too, Guha makes clear that it was in the 
very process of colonialism drawing to an end—and in the multiple violences, large and 
small, that that act and its genealogies entailed—that such inequalities developed. 
Decolonization as supposedly progressive act constituted post-colonies ripe for the 
constitution of heritage hierarchies.   
Discussing the partition and creation of independent India and Pakistan, Guha notes 
that objects belonging to the Archaeological Survey of India were themselves (like the 
Survey’s entire apparatus) partitioned. The consequence of this process includes displays of 
Harappan jewellery in New Delhi’s National Museum which exist in “halved” form, and an 
“Indian jadeite necklace [that] has an extra pendant since Pakistan received a larger share of 
the gold jewellery from [the site of] Taxila.”43 Partition made objects, while also tying those 
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objects to notions of the nation-state’s proper community. Initially, that community was one 
of “secular nationhood.”44 As Guha discusses, however, object labels in the National 
Museum’s Harappan Gallery currently “embody the exhibits as representatives of Hinduism,” 
despite the questionable basis of that interpretation.45 Meanwhile, elsewhere in India the new 
Bihar Museum’s displays of “tribal art” have been mounted without consultation with the 
communities whom those displays supposedly represent.46 Objects are mutable, but that 
mutability can be directed in ways that make resistance to the inequalities of nation-making 
practices less likely.   
 India, of course, does not stand alone in this situation. Returning to the Ramses II 
statue discussed at the start of this piece as one of many possible examples, the manipulation 
of objects in the name of preservation and nation has worked to exclude significant numbers 
of people from accessing forms of heritage in other former colonies, too. Despite (or, more 
accurately, because of) the popular spectacle of the statue’s movement, Ramses was never of 
the people. Discussing the Grand Egyptian Museum that now constitutes the statue’s home, 
Mohamed Elshahed has noted elsewhere how locating the institution and its collections “in a 
desert location outside Cairo’s city center serves Egypt’s current [national] priorities of 
security and tourist exclusivity.”47 Expanding upon this point, he reminds us that the museum 
is located in an area “currently surrounded by unplanned or poorly planned residential areas, 
with no civic center to speak of.” Coupled with “Cairo’s current insufficient public transit 
system … Egyptians [given the way in which Egyptology’s colonial practices separated past 
from present] will be further alienated from their own ancient heritage.”48 The architecture of 
heritage in the post-colony can be used as an act of division: a means of enforcing power 
relations whose genealogy in colonial knowledge formations—and in the perpetuation of elite 
interests—is all too clear.  
 Are there productive ways to attend to such situations and to attempt to dispel their 
inequities? The reflections in this issue by Vikramaditya Prakash on a 1995 keynote given by 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak at the government city of Chandigarh, India, are pertinent here. 
Spivak gave her keynote (“City, Country, Agency”) at a conference—Theatres of 
Decolonization: [Architecture] Agency [Urbanism]—of which Prakash was one of the 
organizers. In a location which itself was formative to Prakash (his father had worked with Le 
Corbusier on the design of Chandigarh), so that keynote, too, became “formative in my 
biography.” And it is at this reflective biographical juncture that his reflections gain their 
urgency: Prakash noting that “elite architects [working, he implies, at places like Chandigarh, 
but also in contemporary, hyper-globalized India] performing easy culturalist readings 
claiming to speak for ‘India’ … have to make sure that these are not just self-serving 
claims.”49 In her keynote, Spivak had herself suggested that “civic agency is where the 
hyphen between nation and state wants to tremble into an equal sign.”50 The question for 
Prakash—and Mohamed Elshahed implies a similar problematic—has been how that 
trembling might take concrete shape. How might such constructive critique happen? 
 To be clear, Prakash’s reflections draw on what has become a historic document. Yet 
one reason to re-print Spivak’s keynote here is how immediate her concerns at the conference 
still seem, to the extent that the world is now living their consequences in an accelerated way. 
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Speaking at a moment when “economic restructuring in the post-Soviet world recodes the old 
scene of decolonization,51” Spivak notes that “the real discourse of postcoloniality … [sits in] 
the abundant reports issued by the World Bank.”52 It is not much of a jump from that 
realization to the Grand Egyptian Museum and the forms of international development 
finance that make that institution and others like it possible, in addition to the moralizing 
justifications that move such money around the globe. Nor is there much of a leap from that 
monumental construction project—which, above all, recodes Egyptian authenticity 
somewhere between the ancient and a hyper-globalized present—and “a superficial 
smattering of Sanskrit” being used in attempts to show that “Hindu India is a living heritage 
as ancient as it is modern.”53 Spivak’s concerns are contemporary because the world is 
grappling with their contrails. It is because the world is in—and shaped by—those conditions, 
though, that her words now seem especially powerful. Spivak’s discussion of failed, post-
independence “stagings of decolonization” in India seems about right given the ways in 
which those stagings have themselves come to seem inescapable elsewhere.54 At the same 
time, though, she also asks the question “do I see any alternatives?”55 Thinking through that 
question is where Prakash’s contribution to this issue sits.     
 For Prakash, Spivak’s provocation is a call to an architectural and preservationist 
ethics couched within an “intersubjective” understanding of the social: a “recognition that my 
actions as an architect are woven into a larger textile that is larger than, exceeds behind and in 
front, and is larger than the experience of ourselves.”56 As he notes (following Spivak’s use 
of lines from certain Sanskrit texts), to make this recognition is to place the architect’s 
subjectivity and agency within “the holding dhāranā of life, entangled simultaneously with 
careful consideration of the situational imperative and open acceptance … of error.”57 As a 
“citizen … tuned to the subaltern” (but not appropriative of subaltern spatial and design 
practices), it is such an act that might ultimately “deconstruct the hegemonic verifying 
fictions of architecture and the architect-hero.”58 Moreover, it is this move against the 
verifying fictions of (heritage and preservationist) architecture that seems most apposite in 
relation to the cases discussed above. Much like Sudeshna Guha’s suggestion that “the 
powerful agency of the object world in resisting meaning-making creates opportunities,” 
however, that move and the recuperative practices it might allow is only possible when 
conditions authorize it: when Prakash’s “open acceptance” becomes possible. Such 
acceptance can be hard to come by, whether in India or elsewhere. 
 
(Im)possible Utopias? On Recuperative, Decolonial Action     
 
Recuperative action in heritage and preservation has not come easily, nor have the conditions 
for taking that action been made easily available. Institutional inertia, for one, has worked to 
compromise attempts to carry out such work: even in cases where the impetus for 
recuperative action seems strong. Beyond the legal strategies used by institutions like the 
British Museum, as decolonial action has risen up the agenda, so attempts to address activist 
demands have been subject to institutional drift and delay.   
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A recent case involving Jesus College, University of Cambridge, illustrates this 
inertia. There, attempts to deal with the history of an object that had long stood on display in 
the college’s dining hall were compromised by institutional politics. The object—a statue of a 
cockerel known as Okukor—was one of the bronzes taken from the Kingdom of Benin during 
the notorious British military expedition of 1897. Jesus College students voted to return the 
bronze in 2016.59 In an apparent moment of positive action, the college then proposed to 
move Okukor to the university’s Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, which was 
known for being “well-rehearsed in engaging in dialogue with its own complex colonial 
history,” and which might act as “a safe space in which the college’s [stated] commitment to 
‘discuss and determine’ Okukor’s future could be met.” As Johanna Zetterstrom-Sharp and 
Chris Wingfield have shown, however, that move constituted one that demonstrates “how a 
stated commitment to postcolonial dialogue can work to circumvent a call for postcolonial 
action.”60 Institutional politics within the university (of which colleges are self-governing 
members) meant that the museum “was ultimately not given the power to enable a 
conversation” around whether the decision of the student vote should be adhered to.61 
Consequently, Okukor was quietly returned to Jesus College. It was only in 2019 that direct 
institutional changes—not least the appointment of Sonita Alleyne as the college’s Master, 
the first woman and person of color to occupy the position—meant that the College Council 
decided that Okukor should in fact be returned to the Court of Benin in contemporary 
Nigeria.62  
 Inertia and disingenuity have long hampered calls for restitution. And as Zetterstrom-
Sharp and Wingfield observe, in relation to anthropological museums this situation has come 
into being not least because of its “reliance upon models of archival excavation.”63 This 
analysis might well be directed toward other types of institution, too. Earlier in this 
introduction, I noted the profusion of provenance research that has arisen as a response to 
calls for decolonization and object restitution in collections across the spectrum. Yet it is 
clear that this research is almost always reactive, in addition to being regularly pre-
determined in its conclusions: the conditions have been created in which “difficult” histories 
can be displayed, but not necessarily acted upon. Consequently, this is not work that listens 
to, reflects on, or is genuinely led by calls for restitution and reparative justice: the sort of 
work demanded both by the case of Okukor and the Sarr-Savoy report. As Zetterstrom-Sharp 
and Wingfield again note,  
 
by centering the broader ethical possibilities afforded by collections through 
scholarly [archival] research, the positions adopted by museum directors have 
deflected specific calls for action by embedding them in a wider framework that 
simultaneously acknowledges a history of colonial violence while avoiding an 
obligation to engage in reparative repatriation.64   
 
In this context, can the archive ever be put to a more positive, proactive use in terms 
of thinking through the issues at hand? More broadly, is decolonial action in relation to 
heritage and preservation actually possible? In the contemporary moment, the fields and 
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institutions under discussion often seem to cleave to vague and utopian statements about 
what, exactly, they can achieve—and at a global level. UNESCO’s communications, for 
instance, regularly constitute a masterpiece of this art: attempting to communicate with “the 
world” that forms the organization’s object, the consequence often seems to be press 
campaigns that communicate with nobody at all.65 Perhaps other utopian practices, however, 
present some cause for hope. Ferdinand de Jong has noted how artists and activists have 
intervened in colonial archives as a way of constructing “utopian pasts and futures” from the 
material found within them.66 As De Jong states, “whichever imperial legacies they have 
found, they have appropriated them for re-significations unanticipated by the colonial 
masters.”67 The constitution of new archives constitutes new possibilities for decolonial 
action. Yet as Zetterstrom-Sharp and Wingfield emphasized, it is also clear that for such 
action to take place, those archives need to be reworked in a way that allows control over 
such institutions to be dispersed: allowing them to become part of the sort of “larger [inter-
subjective] textile” that Vikramaditya Prakash discusses, and opening those archives to 
activist responses in ways that have otherwise been obstructed.68  
 Other architects have also sought to demonstrate that, if used appropriately, the tools 
of their discipline can work to provide reparative justice: “re-use as reparation,” as Emilio 
Distretti and Alessandro Petti put it in their contribution to this issue discussing the remnants 
of fascist architecture in Italy, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.69 Again, the basis of this understanding 
is the sort of inter-subjectivity that actions surrounding Okukor (for example) did not take 
sufficient account of. Most pointedly, Distretti and Petti discuss workshops, run in 
collaboration with the Addis Ababa-based architect Rahel Shawl and members of her studio, 
that called into question the use of the term “decolonization” in the Ethiopian context. 
Regarding such disagreements, the two authors propose a practice based “on a politics of 
reciprocity, alliances and a critical understanding of common colonial heritage as a site of 
conflict and contestation.”70 For Distretti and Petti, this proposal allows a decolonial 
approach of preservationist “de-modernization” that challenges the very values and power 
structures that helped bring the architecture at hand into existence and enables the building of 
new values around it.71  
The question (for this author, anyway) is whether or not such approaches constitute 
too little, too late. Similarly, there is the issue of whether criticisms develop around the 
international funding that often powers such initiatives, in addition to the politics of 
representation that this financial distribution might imply. Distretti and Petti’s work, 
supported by the Royal Institute of Art in Stockholm, is a genuine attempt to effect change. 
Think back, though, to the Grand Egyptian Museum: there, funding from JICA might be 
argued to have had the opposite effect, despite the spectacle—and the real labor and 
expertise—of Egyptian conservators and curators employed there. Can this circle of 
despondence ever be overcome? As statues begin to rain down on the earth—and as activists 
and protesters take it into their own hands to remove objects from institutions like the Musée 
du Quai Branly in Paris—it is more than clear that global structural change around heritage 
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and preservation is not only overdue, but also taking place in the face of the institutions that 
would often seek to obstruct it.72 The fact remains, though, that institutions in heritage and 
preservation will either heed this change or attempt to delay or co-opt it. It is likely in the 
gaps formed in that process that the possibility of making any real alteration to the global 
status quo will happen.  
 
Conclusion: Critical Intimacy 
 
Decolonization was never, and has never been, neutral, and neither has the term’s connection 
to heritage and preservation enjoyed a value-free existence. That situation leaves those fields 
in a difficult place: sutured to their pasts, and mostly unable to propose futures that are all 
that different. Yet this impasse perhaps also offers a possibility. To return to her re-printed 
keynote, Spivak discusses how “deconstruction depends on critical intimacy rather than 
critical distance.” It is in that intimate space that laborers in the fields of heritage and 
preservation dwell. Those workers, as Spivak notes, need to be “morally responsible” for the 
positions that they hold and the labor that they perform, and it is in their intimacy with that 
work that such responsibility can emerge.73 Between the (unlikely) change in conditions that 
many relevant institutions might effect or in the—much more likely—attempts to delay or co-
opt change that they will, I think, now enter into, there exists an intimate space within which 
such moral responsibility can take hold. Anchored to their pasts, there nonetheless exists 
within these institutions and their staffs the knowledge of their working practices and 
histories that potentially allows some form of amendment to occur. 
 I am not, then, arguing for change that pushes responsibility onto people who have 
supposedly been “decolonized.” What I am arguing for is to push the moral onus onto the 
people who work within the institutions of heritage and preservation now, and who have 
access to the levers, even the minor ones, that will enable change to occur. Nothing can 
happen unless those people make a move. As Sumaya Kassim writes in relation to her own 
experiences with staff at the Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery, making that move means 
“acceding privilege, and that is almost always painful.”74 The pain of the privileged, though, 
is nothing in comparison to the pain of those who have felt the violence that such institutions 
have continuously had a hand in; bearing in mind, too, that there are already many layers of 
hierarchy within these places. Critical intimacy for some will mean feeling that pain 
intimately, moving beyond it—and accepting that they should not be the center of attention 
(the same, of course, goes for the current author). It is only then that Prakash’s “open 
acceptance” will become possible; if, for some people, it is possible at all. 
Likewise, to accede privilege also means questioning the value(s) of the institution 
itself, and even its very relevance. As I write this conclusion, ICOM, the International 
Council of Museums, has once again exploded in controversy over the very definition of the 
institution that is its object. At least part of that controversy relates to a suggested new 
definition for museums that has been described, despite several years of discussion, as “too 
political.”75 Despite “the museum is not neutral” becoming a truism, it seems that the 
institution is still only allowed to become political in a certain set of circumstances (and to 
the benefit of certain groups of people). Symptomatic of the sort of existential crisis 
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discussed by Marisa Brown, the controversy in this case might still become generative of a 
different set of futures, situated with respect to a different set of priorities. Yet it is not at all 
clear that it will, and that the intimacy with the institution necessary to admit that its issues 
even exist will be utilized in a productive way. The same is true, and multiplied in scale, 
across global heritage and preservation more generally. Change can come if gatekeepers in 
particular act. Yet to conclude slightly pessimistically, that action mostly remains to be seen. 
Rhodes Must Fall, but Ramses Might Not.   
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